The Monstrosity of Ars Colonia


The soldier

First published in La Furia Umana (Paper Issue) 8, 2015.[1]

In answering the question: ‘What is Cinema Becoming?,’ I return to Raya Martin’s Ars colonia (2011). What I am after really is to find a line of critique – what is becoming in cinema – and to insist that there are no ‘beings’ in cinema, only ‘becomings.’ Consider this a ‘monstrous’ writing, a writing emerging from the back alleys of rhetorical writing, a polemical miscarriage, a vomit of words, an ejaculation of death… While the conventional road of linear discourse can acquaint me with nursed and dolled-up concepts about cinema, I insist on slippages of anything onto everything: netherworlds and farmworlds folding into the thickness of the vegetation; the thinness of the earth folding into rhizomes of the universe – an adieu au langage. One must open the language to let ‘becoming’ take place.

I return to Ars colonia to pay it a visit, to reconcile myself with its images. One night, I was half-awake in bed knotting thoughts upon thoughts: thinking, nursing a monster in my head, creating a dwelling place, a scary place, a decentered place, lingering and looming in the darkest corner of the mind – and it was there, the film becoming a nightmare, a monstrosity.

I return to Ars colonia not to write about it as a subject, but more of elaborating an encounter, a dream, a feeling, a memory of coming back, of coming into sense. I have been haunted again and again by the image of soldier walking at sea in Ars Colonia. I wonder why such a walk would involve a vast sea accompanied by islands. I wonder through and through, in sleeping and waking up, in lying in my bed, in my friend’s bed, in my lover’s bed with his arms wrap around me. I wonder about the soldier and sea and the islands and the explosions and the marching on and on and on… The film, although only one-minute in length, lengthened inside me to hours, days, weeks. It folded the past into my present. Its images distorted my thoughts like how all memories became – a forgetting. The gesture of walking, the feeling of the water brushing through the myriad spaces of the trousers, the weight of the metallic gear on the head – all form an assemblage of an Ars colonial soldier – a haunting, a ghost from the netherworld – I, myself, beginning and becoming the soldier in my dreams.

Ars colonia is a parcel of Martin’s labyrinth. As part of a labyrinth, one does not simply arrive in Ars colonia. One wakes up inside it, trapped and punctured by the lines and forces it bequeaths, for to experience is not to ‘be’ but to ‘become’. To see Ars colonia in its full state, one must ‘become’ the eye of a dreamer sleepwalking along its intersecting planes of virtualities. Ars colonia is an ‘and’ between Independencia (2009) and Buenas Noches, Espana (2011), two other labyrinths in Martin’s career. Ars colonia says goodbye to Independencia by walking out of it, carrying within its body remnants of colors from the last shot of Independencia: a sky etched with sanguine blood seemingly bridging and continuing towards the colored skies of Ars colonia; whereas Ars colonia’s hues and saturations continues towards Buenas Noches, Espana. In effect, Ars colonia becomes a short conduit between the two feature films. It is not, however, a bridge but a passageway, an underground tunnel buried beneath the surface of the earth. It is not a canal but a rhizome, a segment that transforms as it transports liquid. The color effect in the two films Independencia and Ars colonia achieves a tectonic state in Buenas Noches, Espana: as the latter film among the three, Buenas Noches, Espana settles the destiny of its colors by transforming it into an earthquake, a catastrophe of saturations, a chaos aimed to break the retina of the eye more than what Godard’s two films Film Socialisme (2010) and Adieu au Langage (2014) can do.

The Ars colonial landscape is choleric born from Martin’s etching of the celluloid with colored felt-tip pens. Martin suspends, via this process, the portraiture of the ‘old’ in the film, disturbing its supposed historical body with evasive coloring of the sky and the sea. In effect, the whole figurative landscape achieves a vibrational state, heaving and breathing, life-like but animated. The colors’ coarseness, its disruptive energy, leaves a trace of the past in the present. It is as if the artist’s manipulation of the color takes the shape of penetrative pulses of the present intervening the past.

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…The Interlude… (or Can the body of Wolverine be a finalize unquestionable image?)

Two, which stands between one and three, is a gift – a gift of space – a space where one can inscribe residual thoughts, thoughts that remain a secret if undisclosed. This is a space of enchantment. Do not be fixed or settled. This is a temporary passage in the hypertext, a passage between the two main texts: the text prior and the text to come, serving as a bridge, bridging the ‘between’, servicing and serving as a text-bridge, or a bridging text between two different lands of interiority, ‘outside’ and never inside, an extro-bridge that extends to two territorialities: a territoriality of the past and a territoriality of the future.

This writing is a residue, a precipitate, an excess of thought from numerous engagements with other texts, images, gestures, residually escaping from the coding process of the brain. Residual thoughts are weak forces. It has a liminal spirit – part of a ruin but out of place, a remainder, a microscopic dust left underneath a productive machine. A residue can be an interlude, a peripheral malaise, just like this, just like the moment when I wrote this in an exchange: “Minsan may legibility siya like in mainstream cinema, we have the abs of wolverine sa Days of Future Past. abs yun kahit anong gawin natin.” [link]

The residue comes in a form of a question: is the body of Wolverine in X-Men: Days of Future Past (2014), as seen in the series of photographs on top, be a finalized unquestionable image, an image that cannot be undone, destroyed and rethought? Is the image perfect and enclosed? Will it, in the course of time, preserve its musculature – its dents, curvature, bulges – as a ‘fully’ inscribed image?

These questions are peripheral threats. They threaten the cleanliness of the finalized image. Dusts can be small, but their very smallness, their microscopic constituents, their dissemination across the field of question creates a peripheral mess, the very undoing of the main structure. We assume, in many ways, that the main structure – the apparent body of Wolverine – is more important than the residue – that which is folded in the image yet disembodied, undisclosed, a secret musculature beneath the musculature within which the residue arrives as wastage, as remnants of the violent process of hegemonic inscription, composing the marginalia of a central machine – the Hollywood machine. It acts as a subversive force, subverting the dominance of any text: an image, omnipresent in our society – the image of hegemony – the Hollywoodized, extrasexual image. This political gesture of residualizing, which is a form of questioning, also enacts a forward stance – an insistence that this image of Wolverine cannot be final, that it has, hidden beneath its affective structure, the very mechanism of its undoing.

The residual power of thinking participates in the image’s undoing. To undo this finality, this capture of Hollywood, we have to rethink again of what the image is. Residual thoughts are ontological and, at the same time, ontogenetic. It offers the image a chance to live, and it opens our eyes to new ways of seeing, an image is always in co-evolution with its ontogenetic material. The image is self-positing, as Deleuze would say in What is Philosophy?. It is independent of its viewer or its creator. It has a ‘life’ on its own, preserved in blocs of sensation. An image is mobilized by sense i.e. seeing, proprioception, etc. not because it has an agent that controls the propagation of its affects, but it is self-positing. It is also independent of the viewer. Why? Because the viewer is no longer necessary in the life of the image, as in the case of Mona Lisa (La Gioconda), its passage in time is not dependent on its viewer. It is, on its own, self-preserving and its life is preserved in the blocs of sensation that constitutes its body.  But how do we undo this image? How can it escape the capture of language?

Affect escapes – it always escapes language, confinement, and consolidation. Affect is what preserves the image of its vitality, its likeness, its morphology, its living ‘body’. It is nonlinguistic, out of phase with matter, and it’s where the image’s emergence begins. This “escape of affect” is continuous, which gives the image an imperceptible layer – a residue, a shadow, an asymmetry. This imperceptible layer remains untranslatable: in looking at the body of Wolverine, one no longer seizes words. One finds oneself at a breaking point of language. From the image of Wolverine’s body, affect takes over the body. This is not a linguistic event that has means and ends, an objective with a determinable start to finish. It is an affective instantaneous flash. Contours of Wolverine’s musculature are figures of intensities. We do not take them as is (a denotative ‘is’), because it leaves us in a state of unease. The image slips, mutates and transforms in our minds. Our mind wishes to organize it, to perform a regulation of its intensities, but some of the intensities escape because the image does not reside in language. Some of its parts can be ‘seen’, ‘perceived’, but not spoken, written or described.

The image of Wolverine has its own harmonics – a vibrational character. It is in fact a harmonic string, positing its own music. Why is that? It releases an intensity transduced and attenuated by lenses of material excesses within an empirical field. But is this arousal or sexual response a bodily event localized in the body of the observer? The empirical field extends beyond the body. Let’s look at this way: the image and the receiver’s body are not the only participants of this transversal movement of intensities. The receiver’s body is not the subject of intensity closed in on it. When the body is aroused, it also releases an expressible set of intensity, which also affects the surrounding bodies within his periphery. His body might give off heat to the surrounding air, or he might give a laugh or a sneer, which is an aural affect, heard by himself and by other ‘hearing’ receivers around him. Transduction of affect is always within a field in which the interaction between the image and the body is not a binary relation, but rather a field relation, a relay of various signals across an array of sensible objects within a specific field.

The empirical field renders all images and expressions in a state of deconstitution or deconstruction, not finally inscribed or present. It does not impose the present or presence but rather it recomposes a past-future of the image. In the propagation of image within an empirical field, the present (or rather the presence) of the image deconstitute as it constitutes itself. It is an immanent body – not yet there but going there, in process, a becoming, still emerging, bulging out, emitting light particles of different quality. For the power of the image resides not it is perfection, but its ability to deconstitute, to produce a spectre – a haunting presence that would titillate the sensing body – the viewers – to their very ends.

Pornography works that way. A pornographic image is powerful not because it is perfect and finalized but because its power resides in its spectrality – it titillates the brain via erotic haunting – the brain is literally ruptured by the process of erotic haunting, sending shock waves across the geography of the body, transforming the body anew. During the haunting, the brain is at its height of creative process. It circulates the intensities from images of naked bodies on screen as a vortex of sensations. These intensities are disseminated and dissipated in every nerve ending across the body as a violent jolt. In this way, pornography becomes a form of incorporeal violence. This creative impulse is not a natural process. It is learned by multiple viewings and multiple ‘performances’ to oneself – a habituated pleasure. Masturbation is a creative act. It requires the brain and the body to co-produce and co-create network of signals, intensities and sensations: all of which moving at hyperspeed within an empirical field. This pleasurable moment is irreversible and infinite, the similar infinity one feels in a state of hallucination. It is asymmetrical, decentered, and subversive, with a temporal dimension out of phase from the dominant, linearized present time. Arousal is, in other words, a differance, a pleasurable differance, no longer of the present but a multitemporal event, differed and continuously differing from the present.

It can be said that the body achieves a creative evolution when undergoing a process of pleasure. Pleasure is emancipatory and radical. It brings the body to a place ‘beyond’ place, to an event ‘beyond’ the bodily event. Pleasure is a residue of the signification process, a remainder of stratification, neither outside nor inside the main text, but distributed across an empirical field. The image of Wolverine is not a finalized image, inscribed perfectly. It is not totally hegemonic. It rather contains a microscopic emancipatory potential because of its immanent and asymmetrical character. One more thing: the image of Wolverine does not have interiority, because as all images are, it is always pointing outward. It is always exteriorizing itself. Nothing remains. Its base, which one cannot see, the 1/0 codes simulated by the digital machines of this website, runs in parallel to this extensity, this intensive extensity of the image. Its transmission from base to the empirical field is feed-forward.


Mendizabal, A. D. (2015). …The Interlude… (or Can the body of Wolverine be a finalized unquestionable image?). Retrieved January 17, 2016, from


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The Nonface in Class Picture


[This article was published in Kino Punch (Issue 3), U.P. Cinema’s Film Critique Magazine. The magazine was successfully launched last March 28, 2015. The published form of this article has jumbled its footnote section, which is, to me, a curious result. I constructed the footnote section with its own politics. It stands as a threat to the main text, a supplement, inseparable yet removable from the text. The footnote section is the marginalized sector, the subaltern, the silenced, the underground. The dominance of the main text is, in many ways, threatened by the marginalization of the footnote. It is the main text’s undoing. Hence, this online version will preserve this political relationship. It is a modified form of the printed text.] 

The class picture.[1]

In writing about Class Picture (2011), we begin, as in any experimental work, in the middle, the between. The between is a space of liminality, the space where the image resists to ground itself in any given time, in any predetermined space. In writing and in reading about Class Picture, we inhabit this space. And we proceed by saying: an experimental work is always on the verge of transformation, never arrested by space, never stopped by time. It is always speeding towards the future, taking the present and the past with it. The tenuous forces of becoming within its body – their very placement in this space of liminality – jettison various rules of representation by transforming the image of experimentation into an unreadable set of intensities. Each image is a new island, a place to be, a dangerous strip of time and space, a rupturing force of possibilities. Each experimental image is an object of a ‘question’ that ceases to ‘be’ (if ‘be’ stands for being). For each is always a ‘becoming’.

Capturing the image – this is the task of every critic. We capture the image with words. We use language to stop its ceaseless becoming. Language has mastered its mode of reinscribing life itself in its own way – a form of regulation. Writing, any form of writing, is a form of ‘colonialism’. Its apparatus of capture is made of various sets of predetermined concepts that man has mastered through time – the traditional, commonsensical, habitual expressions in dominant language. Film criticism, as a discourse-forming machine, is populated by ‘capturing devices.’ Phrases such as ‘beautiful shot,’ ‘ugly lighting,’ ‘tremendous intensity,’ ‘great frame composition’ circulate in film journalism as ‘catchphrases’ that hold various images in captive. These ‘catchphrases’ resituate the image in a new plane of existence – the realm of dominant language – in order to achieve meaning. Only during this moment of linguistic capture can the image produce meaning. Production of meaning is always a result of image-to-text transformation. Also, we can only interpret an image the moment it reaches language.

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‘Who is time?’: Brassier on Heidegger’s Philosophy of Time

Bibliographic Note: Brassier, Ray. Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. Print. p. 153-156.


My critical summary of Section 6.1 of the book Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. I provided an additional reflection on how this certain section from Brassier’s book can be of help to my Lav Diaz x Time research project.

Brassier begins his 6th Chapter: The Pure and Empty Form of Death with an elaboration of Heidegger’s conceptualization of time in his 1924 essay The Concept of Time, a precursor text to Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time (1929). Brassier highlights Heidegger’s privileging of individuated (and existential) time over ontological time, which constitutes the larger part of Section 6.1. – Who is Time?: Heidegger. In this section, Brassier emphasizes that time cannot be understood in terms of “essence” because essence is only understood as presence. It cannot be studied time-as-being-present because time is never ‘present’. (Brassier 153)

To understand time in a conceptual sense, Brassier insists that the relation between intra-temporality and ontological temporality must be established. The relation between the time-within-being, or that which gives the being an existential duration, and the time-outside-being, or that which gives the universe of beings an absolute duration must be explored to properly provide an ontology of time.

According to Brassier, in Heidegger’s essay, the privileging of individuated time is highlighted by the turning of the object of the temporal analytic towards the Dasein, that, to understand time is also to understand the determining characteristic of Dasein. Heidegger highlights that Dasein has two components: temporal specificity (Jeweiligkeit) and mineness (Jemeinigkeit) and its conceptual constitution is always a ‘mine’ – a specificity of the “I am”.

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Aleiatorytexts for Augustus


Borgesian library-Google Data Bank. (from here)

1. Each text is a construct: a reduction of thoughts’ pluripotentials into a well-arranged, grammatically sound signifying system.  2. To arrange a text is to intervene in thought itself. 3. Hence, the arrangement of the texts in a hypertextual environment is a political act: a will to power is involved. 4. In this day and age of informational catastrophe, the author is self-aware of this text’s complicity with the politics of the digital. 5. This act of hypertextual writing is preconditioned by another construct: an assumption that there exist an anonymous individual X who will read the excess ‘i’ in the text’s title and wonder if it is something that the author of the text intends to typogrify.


Text 1.

. I am currently developing a polemical piece that seeks to critically ‘deconstruct’ the tenets of auteurism tentatively entitled ‘Parricide to the Auteur’. The seed idea came from my reading of Jacques Derrida’s book Of Hospitality where I encountered the radical word ‘parricide’ (a passage of which will be provided in a separate text below). Derrida dispenses the radical potential of a Foreigner as parricidal speculum to the paternal logos. We commonly associate the logos to the rule of law, the central structuring force of all knowledge and discursive structures in the history of thought.

This parricide to the paternal logos is very much close to my developing polemic against the celebritification and mythologization of auteur in today’s film industry. In my developing study on Lav Diaz, I outwardly criticize the signifying logos of the auteur as all-encompassing concept to my philosophical investigation of the Diaz’s cinema’s relation to time.

In one of my papers submitted in Advance Film Theory and Criticism class (Film 270) (view here), I proposed a reconfiguration of the author-function as inherently complicit with the passage of time. In a way, I was trying to re-envision Diaz as a continuing process of constitution and deconstitution, an assemblage of significations and many other things beyond his body. That, in the cultural sphere, he no longer exists as One body, but as a continuous being-in-process , a becoming-in-transition. The massive circulation of texts within and outside the stratifying machine of culture, the free play between signifier and signified, and asubjective ruptures surrounding his work, all of which participate in the constitution and deconstitution of  his ‘being’, transforming him into a ‘differential immanent object.’  To simply put it, ‘Lav Diaz’ no longer exists as purely as Diaz-in-himself but rather his body becomes reconstituted and mediatized by informational, cultural and socio-political fields.

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Intuition as a Method in Philosophy

Bibliographic Note: Deleuze, Gilles, Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 13 – 35

My critical summary of Chapter 1 of Bergsonism. I provided my own examples apart from what Deleuze gave. This is an exercise in making reflective memos, a tip I got from Raul Pacheco-Vega’s blog.

In Chapter 1 of his book entitled Bergsonism, Deleuze emphasized that intuition is a method of ‘precision’ that follows a set of ‘strict rules’. This is indeed counter-intuitive to what we usually think as ‘intuition’. Intuition is not a gut feel; neither it is the feeling that wins you over a bet or a game of luck. It is, for Bergson and also for Deleuze, a philosophical method, a decisive turn in a given duration or state of things. Intuition provides us precise ways of knowing and differentiating lived experiences and reality itself.

Deleuze wrote that Bergson considers intuition as a simple act but this simplicity is accompanied by the act’s involvement with the plurality of meanings and irreducible multiplicities in any given experience. The intuition as a method follows three rules:

  • Statement and creation of problems (a method of problematizing)
  • Discovery of genuine difference in kind (a method of differentiating)
  • Apprehension of real time (a method of temporalizing)

Intuition as a Method of Problematizing

Deleuze’s first criterion for the method of intuition is to ‘apply the test of true and false to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of problems.’

In philosophy, problematizing something i.e. an event, an object, a set of relations, is one of the first steps in drafting a philosophical proposition. Problems are always tied to philosophical concepts and percepts. Bergson (via Deleuze) proposes that it is not enough to state one’s problems accompanying a set of solutions. One has to discern or evaluate whether the stated problem is true or false. In order to do so one uses intuition as a method of qualifying and evaluating problem statements.

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On (Non)Separation of Academic and Public Spheres

Richard Javad Heydarian

This is a circumferential argument on a certain text from Richard Javad Heydarian’s Facebook wall. Heydarian is a political analyst and assistant professor in De La Salle University.

Heydarian’s text conceives a separatist relation between intellectual and public wherein the academic ‘tends to annihilate common sense by boiling down to the most arcane’ and the public ‘tends to boil down to semantics’ and refuse to engage with ‘evidence-driven, systematic analysis.’ What Heydarian renders legible is an unstable binary relation between academic and public. It is a ‘versus’ relation of an allegedly two separate spheres, each sphere described at their disadvantage, particularly their tendencies to ‘boil down’ the productive potential of their debates. Of what particular debate? We are not entirely sure. But Heydarian’s involvement with the foreign policy dispute may give us a context of where this is coming from – a comparison between intellectuals debating with each other and public officials arguing on semantics related to resolving a foreign policy dispute. Heydarian insists that in order to resolve the disadvantaged positions of both the intellectual and public debates, a public intellectual must emerge in-between (maybe as an arbiter?) and whose primary job is to ‘bridge the gaps in both spheres’. This writing does not directly invalidate Heydarian’s positions and arguments raised in the text, but moves in circumferential direction, as an appendage, a preface or a postface, or a note of a note. Consider this a dissemination in Heydarian’s text. By lifting the binary that Heydarian conspired, this text seeks to problematize the binary relation between academic vs. public and propose a new configuration of their relation.

The separation between academic and public has to end. Why? Because it is impractical to continue thinking that the academic and public inhabit two separate worlds. In affirming Alain Badiou’s platonism, there is only One world and we, including non-human animals and objects, all live in it. Each is a parasite and a host to one another. It is only the relations we humans invent that created these hierarchies and division among people, objects and things. In other words, we created the ‘walls’ that divide people from people and objects from things, all for the dissemination of our self-interest. We created the logic of stratification for the class system, the nation-state, the linguistic divide, the institutional divide, the private/public divide. We even created a machine that generates infinite walls based on juridical provisions of the state apparatus – the bureaucracy.

Is the intellectual within the public sphere? Yes, she IS in the public sphere even if she denies it, unless of course if she chooses to be hermetic for the rest of her life. There is no ‘ivory tower’ for academics because these academics live with us. They shape and influence the public sphere more than how the public sphere shapes itself. They are our teachers, Facebook friends, colleagues, government officials, people in the media, etc. They are our lawmakers and justices/judges in the judicial sector. They are our engineers and scientists. They compose the Left, the Center, and the Right flank of the ideological divides, which also includes the apologist, the reactionary, and the apolitical. They are our financial experts who embody all the necessary tenets of neoliberalism and Ayn Rand’s objectivisim, because like any hospitable intellectual, a ‘progress’-ive intellectual can be a host to neoliberal ideas.

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Six Plateaus of Separation from Gilles Deleuze

gilles_deleuze_2_hA personal account of my encounter with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. A work-in-progress. 


Pre-Figuring Deleuze in Figural Analysis


Before I proceed any further to this blog project, I would like to take time in introducing my strange ‘friendship’ with Gilles Deleuze: a friendship which involves “competitive distrust of the rival as much as amorous striving toward the object of desire… claimant and rival.’[1] My admiration for Deleuze traverses between an amorous cohabitation and a rivalry. His philosophy, for the past two years, provided me enough space for thinking. His philosophy became my place of residence, my living abode, my overgrown garden where I could sit every afternoon drinking tea. It is as if each of his concept is meaningfully placed in a space before me, like objects in a toolshed – a network of ideas sliding on top of each other, ceaselessly transforming in each step of the way. Each concept is a friend, a tool, a strange outgrowth. Deleuze easily became a confidant, a keeper of my secrets, a giver of pathways. Yet, one can never be too close to a friend. A right amount of ‘rivalry’ or critical reading and admiration sets the friendship in motion. And for two years we have been in conversation, in continuous debate, which would often amount to a transformative becoming of each other. Am I talking sense here? Is it possible to be in ‘conversation’ with a dead philosopher for two years? Or am I talking about my undisclosed invisible friend named Gilles Deleuze? Well, my encounter with Gilles Deleuze is real. The inscription of his philosophical ideas in my mind did not happen in thin air. I read him. I read his books and wrote marginal notes on it. I also read him through the books written by Deleuzian scholars.  The encounter more or less is real.


Deleuze’s Wake: Tributes and Tributaries, part of SUNY’s Contemporary Continental Philosophy Series, was the first book I bought about Deleuze. It was written by Ronald Bogue, one of the early scholars of Deleuze. I bought it when I was still an undergraduate student in Chemical Engineering (2008-2009) from a Booksale Bookstore at North Avenue. Like many other books at home, it laid on my bookshelf for years. I did not know what to do with it. It is a philosophy book with a strange and unfamiliar language. I remember reading it six years ago confused with the words deterritorialization, asubjectification, refrains, affect, time-image, as if underneath each word lays a secret world: a dense vegetation waiting to be explored and uncovered. My nineteen-year-old self is not enthusiastic enough to partake on a Deleuzian journey. So I left it on my bookshelf for years to gather dust .

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Tracing and Mapping Time


This is just a quick update on my research project. Some exploratory notes on the domain of research. 

My research project on Lav Diaz is becoming a rigorous cartographic project of existing literature exploring the domain of all possible and impossible fields that might actually play in dispensing and distilling the idea of cinema and time. It is unforgivable to perform cartographic sketch for a filmmaker coming from only one root or one guiding framework. Frameworks are arborescent structures. They are centric and centered on subjectivity and historical & cultural determination decreasing potentiality of the plane generative of pure events. The plane for this project must manifest as a empirical space for contending issues which includes not only the problematics of time and cinema but also the following: ontology of representation which dates back to Plato, emancipatory power of cinema , the author/auteur, affect and perception, spectatorship, political economy of time, ethics, the Other and the Minoritarian, digital era, etc.

After tracing and mapping ‘time’ from all directions: from Rodowick (digital x time) to Flusser (post-history) to Bliss Cua Lim (postcolonialism x time) to Agamben (time vs. history) to Deleuze (who reads Bergson, Spinoza and Kant) to Guattari (transversality, ecology) to Derrida (time’s invisibility, differance, trace, critique of metaphysics of presence) to Massumi (perception x time), I am now entering  a differential passage.

  • Toni Negri for labour time
  • Bernard Stiegler for technology x time
  • Jacques Ranciere for image x politics and his writing on Bela Tarr
  • Quentin Meillassoux for his striking proclamation of ‘time as absolute’ in After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency​
  • Ray Brassier for relation of time to extinction
  • some contemporary writings on slow cinema (recently Justin Remes’ Motion(less) Pictures: The Cinema of Stasis)

The project is becoming a hyperplane, a manifold of intersecting discourses, which will eventually collapse into a field or a network of relations that would answer the question: What is the relationship of time and the film image? 

Time is the most difficult component of the project, while Diaz’s cinema remains as an object of philosophical and critical analysis. The relation of time and Diaz’s cinema is a difficult mix of philosophy and cinema studies. I can, however, remain considerably ‘disciplined’ by focusing only on film studies aspect reviewing and integrating only the literature available within the film discipline along with extensive formal film analysis, generating a work of secondary literature. The addition of time as a component to the research stretches the domain of the project.

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Gilles Deleuze – An Extract from The Meillassoux Dictionary


Edinburgh University Press Blog


Jeffrey Bell

Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) is probably Meillassoux’s most important interlocutor, the philosopher who is both closest to his own concerns and yet the one with whom he most strongly disagrees. On the one hand, both Deleuze and Meillassoux place great emphasis on contingency, and each draws from the work of David Hume in important respects in order to make the case for contingency. The central thesis and subtitle of Meillassoux’s After Finitude is that the only thing that is necessary is the necessity of contingency. Deleuze and Guattari, similarly, will call out in What is Philosophy? against what they label the cult of necessity and will reaffirm Nietzsche’s own advocacy of the roll of the dice, the chance and contingency inseparable from all things. In What is Philosophy? they will also give philosophy the task of creating concepts, a task that entails affirming and embracing…

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