Tag Archives: Gilles Deleuze

Marx Contra Deleuze: Towards a Materialist Constitution of the Cinematic Sign


This paper was presented during the Marx @ 200 Conference on May 26, 2018 at Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines Diliman under the Panel on ‘Issues in Marxist Philosophy.’


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Good Afternoon!

I will be presenting a paper titled Marx contra Deleuze: Towards a Materialist Constitution of the Cinematic Sign. As a preliminary study, this paper will not delve into the details and intricacies of Deleuzian philosophy. My main purpose today is to show the general dialectical relationship between Deleuze and Marx. This paper generally argues that different philosophies of cinema must be liquidated and critique for their lack of historicity, attention to material conditions of filmmaking, and complicity to the fetishistic dimension of cinema.

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Discussion Guide

As a guide, my discussion will focus first on the general contradictions in Deleuze’s books on cinema, highlighting perhaps its metaphysics via Bergsonism. After which, we locate Deleuze’s project in the larger discourse on cinema-as-art and raise the stakes as to how Deleuze’s philosophy of cinema conceals a more important layer of cinematic mode of production. From there, we proceed in presenting a dialectical possibility of creating a materialist constitution of the cinematic sign.

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Who is Gilles Deleuze?

Gilles Deleuze is one of the most celebrated French poststructuralist philosophers of the last century along with Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. He has written extensively on the works of philosophers like Nietzsche, Bergson, Hume, Kant; and on art forms like music, painting and cinema. Some of you might know him as the co-author of the book series Capitalism and Schizophrenia, in which, alongside Felix Guattari, they tried to sharpen Marx’s critique of capitalism through a radical re-appropriation of Spinoza, Lacan, Hume, and other philosophers. This resulted to a Deleuzian theory of the multiple, which today is popular among critical discourses in Western arts and humanities.

 

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Deleuze’s Ahistorical Conceptualism

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from here.

Part 1 of 13 of my comprehensive note-series on Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989.


Bibliographic Note: Deleuze, Gilles, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: The Athlone Press, 1986), ix ‚Äď xiv.


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This is my critical summary of the two prefaces and translator’s introduction of Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. This is an exercise in making reflective memos, a tip I got from Raul Pacheco-Vega’s blog.

Preliminary Notes

Before I start to lay down some of my thoughts on three interesting introductory pages that precede the main content of Gilles Deleuze’s Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, let me first provide some context regarding this project. This project has been brewing in my mind since last year. My problem is actually simple to say: how does one crate a provisional link between Deleuze’s Cinema project, which dealt directly with time and movement, and Marx’s concept of time in his books Capital Vol 1 and German Ideology.

In reading side by side Deleuze and Marx, one can potential extract sites of crisis wherein we can enunciate a temporal/durational materialism. This may sound far flung and may perhaps been unoriginal as there might be several isolation of the concept elsewhere in various strands of thinking, but in my attempt, I shall try to bridge Deleuze’s transcendental method with Marx’s dialectical & historical materialist method to arrive at a provisionally new materialism that can materially account for the temporality of cinema, or of matter in general. This project is part of my research for the upcoming conferences I will be attending.

An Ahistorical Accounting of Cinematographic Concepts

In both Deleuze’s Preface for the English Edition and Preface for the French Edition of Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, there is obvious declaration of ahistoricism, a pivotal gesture that opens Deleuze’s two-volume book on cinema. Cinema 1 is about the production of the movement-image, while Cinema 2 is about the production of the time-image. Both of which are separated by ironically a historical juncture: the World War II. One can get easily entangled with Deleuze’s duality. Although Deleuze’s project can qualify as general philosophy, the specificity of Deleuze’s rupture can only be attributed to a cinematic production of continental Europe. Deleuze created a historical juncture between Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 without acknowledging the need to engage with the historical specificifity of his division. In comparison, between Deleuze film-philosophy and the neoformalist and historical poetics project of Bordwell and Thompson, the latter might give a more informative take on the changes of film aesthetics over a period of time albeit their lack of political inattention to issues of image production in general, while Deleuze’s work remains, at best, an attempt at a refusal to engaged in historicity and specificity of the film image.

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From Night and Fog (Alain Resnais / France / 1955)

Since it lacks a historic-material grounding, Deleuze’s historical division between pre-war (WWII) and post-war cinema (WWII) can be reinterpreted as form of aesthico-philosophical categorization to demarcate two modes of Bergsonian temporality responsive of pre-trauma and post-trauma events, or events of absolute deterritorialization (such as the World War) primarily caused by reorganization of ontological, political and cultural landscape.

While this duality provides Deleuze a rupture to rethink cinema in reference to time, it lacks the material anchor for a pure corporeal take on cinematic temporality. For once, Deleuze denies his project as historical one. In the first sentence of his Preface to the English Edition, he wrote: ‚ÄėThis book does not set out to produce a history of the cinema but to isolate certain cinematographic concepts‚Äô (p. ix). In writing this passage, Deleuze draws the line between philosophy and cinema studies, between idealism and materialism, and in the process, proceeds forth with a project that runs the risk of becoming an ahistorical accounting of cinematographic concepts that lead further to a mystification of cinema‚Äôs supposed temporal materiality.

What is a Cinematographic Concept?

He further obfuscates the matter by navigating through a series of categories that further veils cinematic temporality. Cinematographic concept, for Deleuze, is:

  • Non-Technical ‚ÄďDeleuze is not concerned with technical categorization of ‚Äėvarious kinds of shots or the different camera movements.‚Äô (p. ix) This is rather dubious since, at the latter part of the book, he will recast the shot, the cut, the camera movement from a technical vantage point but filtered through Bergsonian terminologies.
  • Non-Critical ‚Äď Deleuze is also not concerned with a critical categorization of cinema in terms of various categories of values available in film studies such as genres, etc. (p. ix) Yet, Deleuze will also mention genre distinctions in some of his subsections. In Chapter 10, he titled a section The Western in Hawks: functionalism/the neo-Western and its type of space (Mann, Peckinpah).
  • Non-Linguistic ‚Äď Nor is Deleuze concerned with the categorization of cinema as a universal language, transmediatic in all aspects (easily translatable from one medium to another).(p. ix)

In a definitive grasp, for Deleuze, a cinematographic concept is attributable to the following characteristics:

  • A Pre-Verbal Intelligible Content (Pure Semiotic) ‚Äď Cinematic images neither reside in language nor in any ‚Äėlinguistically inspired semiology‚Äô. It is, as Deleuze posits, a pre-verbal sign that maintains its intelligible primacy. (p. ix)
  • An Automatic Image of Time (Movement-Image and Time-Image) ‚Äď Deleuze also proffers that the cinematic image is directly or indirectly associated with the image of time.

This leads us to a further qualification of what a cinematographic concept is. From here on, Deleuze struggles to piece together a systematic, albeit limited, ahistorical accounting of what a cinematographic concept is via creating a bifurcation path between movement-image and time image.

From Movement-Image to Time-Image

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From Your Name (Makoto Shinkai / Japan / 2016)

Deleuze’s characterization of the cinematographic concept can be summarily put as his effort to grapple the relation of time and the cinematic image. He returns to Bergson to extract fundamental theses on the components of cinematographic concept. Deleuze seemed to be dissatisfied by how film theorists of his time think about the film image. In the 1970s, there is a strict compulsion of film studies to recast the film image in terms of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, Althusserian Marxism and some strands of Saussurian semiotics. When Deleuze published Cinema 1: The Movement-Image in 1983, it was a pivotal polemic against the dominant strand of film theorizing popular at that time in Europe in similar trajectory that Bordwell and Thompson responded with their neoformalism and historical poetics.

What Deleuze reinjected in film studies is a path-breaking reconsideration of some of the basic tenets of the film image namely the unresolved and often veiled issue of the relation between film image and time and temporality. We can declare Deleuze’s books as the Bergsonian shift of film studies and the inaugural moment of a new inter-disciplinary field of film philosophy. But not much has progressed since this Bergsonian shift in film studies. Deleuze’s publication of the Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 gave rise to multitudes of secondary studies that apply, refute or extend Deleuze’s core theses on the cinematic image or movement. Notable studies such as Massumi’s Parables of the Virtual, Connolly’s Neuropolitics, Zourabichvili’s Deleuze: A Philosophy of the Event, and the works of speculative realists/materialists such as Meillassoux, Brassier, Land and Negarestani have long pushed the theoretical envelope beyond Bergsonian film philosophy into newer realms of ontology and epistemology.

One of the under-researched paths out of Bergsonian film philosophy is the relation of Marx and Deleuze in terms of temporality. There is a thin literature that problematizes this juncture, and in an attempt to reinstate a materialist theory of cinematic image, we go back to Deleuze’s inaugural book, Cinema 1, to retrace the steps and identify sites of contradictions that generate a crisis.

For one, movement-image and time-image are general concepts with sub-components called signs and typically occurs in various tendencies. The difference between movement-image and time-image can be elaborated below:

  • Movement-Image
    • Indirect representation of time
    • Schemata: Time is derived from movement
  • Time-Image
    • Direct image of time
    • Schemata: Movement is derived from time
    • Creates false movements
    • Made possible by War (World War II in particular)
    • Shatters the sensory-motor schema
    • Signifies that a ‚Äėgeneral regime of the image‚Äô has been changed

Deleuze insists that, in terms of value, no hierarchy between time-image and movement-image exists. However, this is contradictory to Deleuze‚Äôs method of choosing his material. He insists that in using filmic masterpieces as exemplary material for enunciating his film philosophy, ‚Äėno hierarchy of values applies.‚Äô (p. x) This is problematic in a sense that in privileging auteurs and masterpieces, a large portion of the optical media will be ignored. In Deleuze‚Äôs time, there is an evident appearance of late capitalism‚Äôs market saturation of surplus image. Deleuze seemingly effaces the notion of canons and other forms of image production in this project rendering this inaugural work as incomplete, a product of idealism, which is evident in Deleuze‚Äôs optimistic remark: ‚ÄėThe cinema is always as perfect as it can be, taking into accounts the images and signs which it invents and which it has at its disposal at a given moment.‚Äô (p. x)

Cinema 1 as a Philosophical Work and a Work of Cinema Studies

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From All that Heaven Allows (Howard Hawks / USA / 1950)

In the Translator’s Introduction to the book written jointly by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, we get a clear dispensation of Deleuze’s work. They both argue that Deleuze’s Cinema project is both a work of philosophy and a work of cinema studies, and can be described, at best, as an exemplification of Deleuze’s radical view of philosophy.

For them, Cinema 1 is a work of philosophy along the lines of concept creation. They have highlighted two thinkers that influenced the work: Henri Bergson, whose radical view of the image helped Deleuze in reconceptualising his notion of the filmic image, and Charles Sander Peirce, which provided ‚Äėa powerful typology with which to approach images of types‚Äô (p. xi).

Cinema 1 can also be considered as a work of cinema studies in a sense that Deleuze discuss a large number of image and films, and ‚Äėadvances general views about the ‚Äėtypes‚Äô of films‚Äô (p. xi). Tomlinson and Habberjam are, however, not convinced that Deleuze‚Äôs work produces a new type of film theory, but rather, it is a film philosophy classifiable by the following characteristic. Cinema 1 and 2 as a whole is a work of film philosophy because:

  • Philosophical concepts presented in the work are non-Hegelian dialectical constructs in a sense that they are not a reflection of an external object or reality,
  • Philosophical concepts in the book, in Deleuze‚Äôs purview, are intensities, direct mental impressions, which are impersonal.
  • Philosophical concepts in the book are images of thought.

For Tomlinson and Habberjam, the work is not a film theory for the following reasons:

  • The work particulates a creation and invention of concepts alongside cinema‚Äôs creation of new images.
  • Since film theory is concerned with phenomenological mapping of cinema, Deleuze insists for new method concept creation by way of decoupage (cut-&-paste) by grouping different things, wherein (a) boundaries an undermined and (b) new assemblages are created.

This led the two interlocutors to conclude that the book is an intercutting of cinema and philosophy: ‚ÄėAs such, it brings together a whole range of terms from each sphere, many of which may be unfamiliar to readers more at home in the other‚Äô (p. xii). This shows that the Deleuze‚Äôs Cinema project is far from the materialist paradigm of critique, but an exemplification of what Marx has feared: the return to idealism.

What is lacking in Deleuze‚Äôs project, in this initial reading of its introductory pages, is the engagement and entanglement with the material condition of cinema itself. Although one might argue that this conclusion was activated from a certain ‚Äėbiased‚Äô (if there is such a word?) counter-ideology of Marxism, the necessity of entangling with the material is irrevocably linked to a recognized fact that there are larger forces at work beyond one‚Äôs solipsistic view: a recognition of a reality, a public, outside one‚Äôs subjectivity.

(2,033 words)

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Compre Exam Review Notes and Updates #1: Zhang Yimou/Campos/D&G/

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DAY 1 Р3: REFERENCE HUNTING

With only a few days after the orientation last January 9, I spent my few days gathering all the book needed for the review. Very, very special thanks to Rose Roque for providing more than enough reading material for borrowing, especially the Philippine Cinema section. I also bought books available at the academic press. Thanks to mother and father for providing financial contribution for the references I bought. I still have other references to look for and book to photocopy. I managed to find other references in the web and have them printed right away. I will have access to other book tomorrow @ the library.

So far, I have 80% of the required literature reading and I am infinitely astounded by the volume of readings I have read. What more if this is a PhD exams? Can I survive? I enjoy theory a lot and I enjoy reading all these texts, but given the time pressure, it’s a torture. Let’s put it in numbers: 25 books in one month. The hell with it! Let’s read them all, even at lightning speed.

DAY 4: A Day with Zhang Yimou

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JAN 14 (Sat) – I saw for the first time Zhang Yimou’s Raise the Red Lantern (1991), one of the required films for the comprehensive exams. It was astounding! The use of color red as a metaphor for so many things, but does it function only at the metaphorical level? The color red functions also as a cultural index and a territorial marker. I could go at length in discussing the geopolitics of red, and even implicate McKenzie Wark’s Molecular Red for odd reasons. Where am I going? But the¬†delirium and poststructuralist avowal of the color red in the film reactivates the politicization of the mise-en-scene. The mise-en-scene is at work here. ¬†More of writings on this in the next few days.

Day 5A: Campos and Crossings

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Day 5B: C

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Aleiatorytexts for Augustus

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Borgesian library-Google Data Bank. (from here)

1. Each text is a construct: a reduction of thoughts’ pluripotentials into a well-arranged, grammatically sound signifying system. ¬†2. To arrange a text is to intervene in thought itself. 3. Hence, the arrangement of the texts in a hypertextual environment is a political act: a will to power is involved. 4. In this day and age of informational catastrophe, the author is self-aware of this text’s¬†complicity with the politics of the digital. 5. This act of hypertextual writing is preconditioned by another construct: an¬†assumption that there exist¬†an anonymous¬†individual X who will read the excess ‘i’ in the text’s title and wonder if it is something that the author of the text intends to typogrify.


 

Text 1.


Anti-Auteur
. I am currently developing a polemical piece that seeks to critically ‘deconstruct’ the tenets of auteurism tentatively entitled ‚ÄėParricide to the Auteur‚Äô. The seed idea came from my reading of Jacques Derrida‚Äôs book Of Hospitality where I encountered the radical word ‚Äėparricide‚Äô (a passage of which will be provided in a separate text below). Derrida dispenses the radical potential of a Foreigner as parricidal speculum¬†to the paternal logos. We commonly associate the logos¬†to¬†the rule of law, the central structuring force of all knowledge and discursive structures in the history of thought.

This parricide to the paternal logos is very much close to my developing polemic against the celebritification and mythologization of auteur in today’s film industry. In my developing study on Lav Diaz, I outwardly criticize the signifying logos of the auteur as all-encompassing concept to my philosophical investigation of the Diaz’s cinema’s relation to time.

In one of my papers submitted in Advance Film Theory and Criticism¬†class (Film 270) (view here), I proposed a reconfiguration of the author-function as inherently complicit with the passage of time. In a way, I was trying to re-envision Diaz as a continuing process of constitution and deconstitution, an assemblage of significations and many other things beyond his body. That, in the cultural sphere, he no longer exists as One body, but as a¬†continuous being-in-process¬†, a¬†becoming-in-transition. The massive circulation of texts within and outside the¬†stratifying machine of culture, the free play between signifier and signified, and asubjective ruptures surrounding his work, all of which¬†participate in the constitution and deconstitution of ¬†his ‚Äėbeing‚Äô, transforming him into a ‚Äėdifferential immanent object.’ ¬†To simply put it, ‚ÄėLav Diaz‚Äô no longer exists as purely as Diaz-in-himself but rather his body becomes¬†reconstituted and mediatized by informational, cultural and socio-political fields.

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Intuition as a Method in Philosophy

Bibliographic Note: Deleuze, Gilles, Bergsonism, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson & Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 13 – 35


My critical summary of Chapter 1 of Bergsonism. I provided my own examples apart from what Deleuze gave. This is an exercise in¬†making reflective memos, a tip I got from Raul Pacheco-Vega’s blog.


In Chapter 1 of his book entitled Bergsonism, Deleuze emphasized that intuition is a method of ‘precision’ that follows a set of ‚Äėstrict rules‚Äô. This is indeed counter-intuitive to what we usually think as ‚Äėintuition‚Äô. Intuition is not a gut feel;¬†neither it is the feeling that wins you over a bet or a game of luck. It is, for Bergson and also for Deleuze, a philosophical method, a decisive turn in a given duration or state of things. Intuition provides us precise ways of knowing and differentiating lived experiences and reality itself.

Deleuze wrote¬†that Bergson considers intuition as a simple act but this simplicity is accompanied by the act’s¬†involvement with the plurality of meanings and irreducible multiplicities in any given experience. The intuition as a method follows three rules:

  • Statement and creation of problems (a method of problematizing)
  • Discovery of genuine difference in kind (a method of differentiating)
  • Apprehension of real time (a method of temporalizing)

Intuition as a Method of Problematizing

Deleuze‚Äôs first criterion for the method of intuition is to ‚Äėapply the test of true and false to problems themselves. Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of problems.‚Äô

In philosophy, problematizing something i.e. an event, an object, a set of relations, is one of the first steps in drafting a philosophical proposition. Problems are always tied to philosophical concepts and percepts. Bergson (via Deleuze) proposes that it is not enough to state one’s problems accompanying a set of solutions. One has to discern or evaluate whether the stated problem is true or false. In order to do so one uses intuition as a method of qualifying and evaluating problem statements.

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Six Plateaus of Separation from Gilles Deleuze

gilles_deleuze_2_hA personal account of my encounter with the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. A work-in-progress. 

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Pre-Figuring Deleuze in Figural Analysis

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Before I proceed any further to¬†this blog project, I would like to take time in introducing my strange ‘friendship’ with Gilles Deleuze: a friendship¬†which involves “competitive distrust of the rival as much as amorous striving toward the object of desire…¬†claimant and rival.’[1] My admiration for Deleuze traverses between an¬†amorous¬†cohabitation¬†and a¬†rivalry. His philosophy, for the past two years, provided me enough space for thinking. His philosophy became my¬†place of residence, my living¬†abode, my overgrown garden where I could sit¬†every afternoon drinking tea. It is as if¬†each of his concept is¬†meaningfully placed in a space before¬†me, like objects in a toolshed –¬†a network of ideas sliding on top of¬†each other, ceaselessly transforming in each step of the way. Each concept is a friend, a tool, a¬†strange outgrowth.¬†Deleuze¬†easily¬†became a confidant, a keeper of my secrets, a giver of pathways.¬†Yet, one can never be too close to a friend.¬†A right amount of ‘rivalry’ or critical reading and admiration sets the friendship in motion. And for two years we have been¬†in¬†conversation, in continuous debate, which would often amount to a transformative becoming of each other. Am I talking sense here? Is it possible to be in ‘conversation’ with a dead philosopher for two years? Or am I talking about my undisclosed invisible friend named Gilles Deleuze? Well, my encounter with¬†Gilles Deleuze is real. The inscription of his philosophical ideas in my mind did not happen in¬†thin air. I read him. I read his books and wrote marginal notes on it. I also read him through¬†the books written by Deleuzian scholars. ¬†The encounter more or less is¬†real.

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Deleuze’s Wake: Tributes and Tributaries, part of SUNY’s Contemporary Continental Philosophy Series, was the first book I bought about Deleuze. It was written by Ronald Bogue, one of the early scholars of¬†Deleuze. I bought it when I was still an¬†undergraduate student in Chemical Engineering (2008-2009) from a¬†Booksale Bookstore¬†at North Avenue. Like many other books at home, it¬†laid¬†on my bookshelf for years. I did not know what¬†to do with it. It is a¬†philosophy¬†book¬†with a strange and unfamiliar language. I remember reading it six years ago confused with the words deterritorialization, asubjectification, refrains, affect, time-image, as if underneath each word lays¬†a secret world: a¬†dense vegetation waiting to be explored and uncovered. My nineteen-year-old self is not¬†enthusiastic enough to partake on a Deleuzian¬†journey.¬†So I left it on my bookshelf for years¬†to gather dust .

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Tracing and Mapping Time

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This is just a quick update on my research project. Some exploratory notes on the domain of research. 

My research project on Lav Diaz is becoming a rigorous cartographic project of existing literature exploring the domain of all possible and impossible fields that might actually play in dispensing and distilling the idea of cinema and time. It is unforgivable to perform cartographic sketch for a filmmaker coming from only one root or one guiding framework. Frameworks are arborescent structures. They are centric and centered on subjectivity and historical & cultural determination decreasing potentiality of the plane generative of pure events. The plane for this project must manifest as a empirical space for contending issues which includes not only the problematics of time and cinema but also the following: ontology of representation which dates back to Plato, emancipatory power of cinema , the author/auteur, affect and perception, spectatorship, political economy of time, ethics, the Other and the Minoritarian, digital era, etc.

After tracing and mapping ‘time’ from all¬†directions: from Rodowick (digital x time) to Flusser (post-history) to Bliss Cua Lim (postcolonialism x time) to Agamben (time vs. history) to Deleuze (who reads Bergson, Spinoza and Kant) to Guattari (transversality, ecology) to Derrida (time’s invisibility, differance, trace, critique of metaphysics of presence) to Massumi (perception x time), I am¬†now entering ¬†a differential passage.

  • Toni Negri for labour time
  • Bernard Stiegler for technology x time
  • Jacques Ranciere for¬†image x politics and his writing on Bela Tarr
  • Quentin Meillassoux for his¬†striking proclamation of ‘time as absolute’ in After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency‚Äč
  • Ray Brassier for relation of time to extinction
  • some contemporary writings on slow cinema (recently Justin Remes’ Motion(less) Pictures: The Cinema of Stasis)

The project is becoming a hyperplane, a manifold of intersecting discourses, which will eventually collapse into a field or a network of relations that would answer the question: What is the relationship of time and the film image? 

Time is the most difficult component of the project, while Diaz’s cinema remains as an object of philosophical and critical analysis. The relation of time and Diaz’s cinema¬†is¬†a difficult mix of philosophy and cinema studies.¬†I can, however, remain considerably ‘disciplined’ by focusing only on film studies aspect¬†reviewing and integrating only the¬†literature available within the film discipline along with extensive formal film analysis, generating a work of secondary literature. The¬†addition of¬†time as a component to the research¬†stretches the¬†domain¬†of¬†the project.

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Cine-Philosophy?

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A Moment of Innocence (Moshen Makhmalbaf / Iran / 1996)

Q: What is it like to move between cinema and philosophy?

By relation, they are not opposites. Nor can we define this movement as absence or presence of one another, as in the closer it is to cinema, the more it becomes an absence of philosophy or the closer it is to philosophy, the more obscure cinema becomes.  Instead, the movement must be conceived as a violent movement of thinking between the two disciplines. Thought bridges the two disciplines. It forms a plane where two disciplines co-exist, where the film image and its affects co-exists with concepts, where Orson Welles is adjacent to Baruch Spinoza, where a cinematographic cut can be thought off alongside with the concept of the panopticon.

Is this plane possible? Cine-philosophical plane is not separate from the real world. Well, it is real because, as we speak, it is being constructed in this text. This hypertext participates and collaborates in the signification of its unstable and fleeting existence in this world. It exists not because we believe in it, but because its expressible intensities, the words ‚Äėcinephilosophical plane‚Äô and its expressivity emitted by several LED components of your screen is within ‚Äď and this is where philosophy kicks in ‚Äď the order of the visible, the sensible, the perceptible, the expressible. Its visibility, its signifying movement in the digital plane, its inscription in the global network of information called the internet as pixilated bits grants its mobility and existence in the world.

The question: is the ‚Äėcine-philosophical plane‚Äô fiction or real? is no longer important. Because as we speak, the movement of the fictive layer of our world: God, the Virgin Mary, the Terminator, Neo of the Matrix, String theory, Harry Potter is already at work more than ever. Each is deployed at various intensities, each affects us in an incorporeal manner ‚Äď in other words, we are moved even by fiction. It is very hard to think of the real world divorced from fictions. Social scientist Bruno Latour theorized that the effect of incorporeal and corporeal events are very much alike but differ in their intensities of affectation. As Levi Bryant puts it ‘the incorporeal and corporeal realms are equally capable of having effects on the world.’[1] Cinema and literature, and even music, are not divorced from these fictions. In fact, they feed from it. They are industries of fictions and incorporeal intensities, which move us beyond the ordinary banal world we experience. They create new worlds, new modes of thinking, new sensations, most of which cannot be captured by the vapidity and simplicity of the real world. And this is where the ‚Äėcine-philosophical plane‚Äô reside, as a between-plane between two plateaus of discourse: the first one, cinema, a plateau of affects, percepts, sensations and the second one, philosophy, a plateau of concepts and relations.

For cinephiles, filmmakers and even film scholars, the common misconception of cinephilosophy is that it is field where cinema can be conceived as a philosophy, or in other variants, in order to conceive a film, one must consult philosophy: ‚ÄúI must apply Marxism in this film. I must apply Freud‚Äôs Interpretation of Dreams. I must show the idea of Baudrillard‚Äôs simulacra.‚ÄĚ Miguel de Beistegui, reiterating Deleuze‚Äôs famous talk on philosophy and art in 1987 entitled ‚ÄėWhat is the Creative Act?‚Äô, that artists and scientists ‚Äėdo not need the help of philosophers to reflect on their respective field: the only ones who can adequately reflect on mathematics are the mathematicians themselves, on film the filmmakers, etc.‚Äô [2]

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